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ABSTRACT
Several influential organisations have attempted to 
quantify the costs and benefits of expanding access to 
interventions—like contraceptives—that are expected 
to decrease the number of pregnancies. Such health 
economic evaluations can be invaluable to those making 
decisions about how to allocate scarce resources for 
health. Yet how the benefits should be measured 
depends on controversial value judgments. One such 
value judgment is found in recent analyses from the 
Disease Control Priority Network (DCPN) and the Study 
Group for the Global Investment Framework for Women’s 
and Children’s Health. Noting the decrease in the number 
of pregnancies expected to result from providing access 
to family planning, DCPN and the Study Group claim that 
a substantial benefit of such interventions is averting 
the stillbirths and child deaths that would have resulted 
from those pregnancies. We argue that health economic 
analyses should not count such averted deaths as 
benefits in the same way as saved lives. First, by counting 
averted stillbirths and child deaths as a benefit but not 
counting as a cost the lives of babies who survive, DCPN 
and the Study Group implicitly commit themselves to 
antinatalism. Second, this method for calculating the 
benefits of family planning interventions implies that 
infertility treatments are harmful. Determining how 
potential people should be treated in health economic 
analyses will require grappling with population ethics.
INTRODUCTION
Health systems around the world operate under 
conditions of scarcity. Not all interventions that 
would benefit people in the populations they serve 
can be funded, so difficult choices must be made 
about where to allocate limited resources. Making 
these decisions in systematic and justifiable ways 
requires data on the costs and the expected benefits 
of different possible health interventions.
One important set of interventions that healthcare 
systems may provide are reproductive, maternal, 
newborn and child health (RMNCH) interventions. 
Some RMNCH interventions, such as contracep-
tives, provide individuals with the means to prevent 
conception and are therefore predicted to reduce 
the number of pregnancies in a population. Some 
others, such as treatment of chlamydia and gonor-
rhoea, instead reduce individuals’ risks of infertility.
Two influential research groups—the Study 
Group for the Global Investment Framework 
for Women’s and Children’s Health (the Study 
Group) and the Disease Control Priorities Network 
(DCPN)—have published comprehensive models 
of the health and economic benefits of scaling up 
RMNCH interventions in low- income and middle- 
income countries (LMICs).1 2 For the most part, the 
Study Group and DCPN’s analyses of the costs and 
health benefits of RMNCH interventions look just 
like other health economic analyses that are used as 
inputs to decision- making. But something curious 
happens when they present the health benefits of 
reproductive health interventions that decrease the 
number of pregnancies among their targeted popu-
lations, such as increasing access to family planning 
and contraceptives.
One health benefit from a decrease in pregnan-
cies is a drop in maternal mortality. But the decrease 
in the number of pregnancies, the Study Group and 
DCPN argue, has another, more substantial benefit: 
a huge reduction in the number of stillbirths and 
child deaths. Some of these stillbirths and child 
deaths are prevented because wider birth spacing 
is associated with healthier children.3 However, the 
majority of the prevented newborn and child deaths 
that the Study Group and DCPN calculate as bene-
fits of family planning are averted by preventing the 
decedents from ever existing.1 2
In this paper we critically assess the claim that 
evaluations of family planning interventions should 
count averting potential stillbirths and child deaths 
through non- existence as benefits in the same way 
they count other health benefits. We argue that 
they should not. As Hilary Greaves has previously 
argued, there are significant differences between 
saving an existing fetus or child’s life through 
preventing a source of mortality like HIV and 
averting a potential fetus or child’s death through 
non- existence.4 If deaths averted through non- 
existence are to be counted as benefits, then this 
requires both substantial normative argument and 
the inclusion of a set of beneficiaries much wider 
than just third- trimester fetuses and children who 
die young.
The paper progresses as follows. Section two 
describes the findings of the Study Group and 
DCPN. Section three argues that in choosing to 
count averted stillbirths and child deaths as bene-
fits but not count long, healthy lives that are also 
averted as costs, the Study Group and DCPN 
implicitly commit themselves to some sort of 
antinatalist position. Section four argues that the 
Study Group and DCPN’s method for calculating 
the benefit of reproductive healthcare interven-
tions that predictably reduce the number of preg-
nancies or births implies that infertility treatments 
are harmful or otherwise problematic. Section five 
offers a diagnosis. We argue that the Study Group 
and DCPN’s mistaken reasoning is proximately 
caused by treating the size of a population itself—
numbers of people qua numbers of people—as 
a health problem. It is ultimately caused by their 
treatment of questions about bringing people into 
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existence, which are problems in population ethics, in the same 
way as ethical questions about existing people.
CALCULATIONS OF THE BENEFITS OF FAMILY PLANNING
The Study Group is coordinated by the WHO and the Part-
nership for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health. Their Global 
Investment Framework for Women’s and Children’s Health 
makes the case for ‘how investment in women’s and children’s 
health will secure high health, social, and economic returns’.1 
They model the costs and benefits of expanding coverage of six 
packages of RMNCH interventions in 74 countries. These coun-
tries have been selected for their high burden of maternal and 
child mortality; combined, they have a population of 4.9 billion 
and account for over 95% of maternal and child deaths world-
wide. The health interventions include access to family planning, 
maternal and newborn health interventions (eg, post- abortion 
care, skilled birth assistance, folic acid supplementation), 
malaria and HIV prevention and treatment, immunisations and 
child healthcare (eg, oral rehydration therapy, antibiotics for 
dysentery).
According to the Study Group’s model, a ‘high- coverage 
scenario’ would entail spending an additional US$5 per person 
per year (~US$30 billion per year). They estimate it would 
prevent 5 million maternal deaths, 147 million child deaths and 
32 million stillbirths by 2035. Roughly half of the child deaths 
prevented can be chalked up to promotive, preventative and 
curative health services (eg, oral rehydration therapy and zinc 
for diarrhoea treatment). These prevented deaths are lives saved. 
The rest result from scaled up family planning, which reduces 
the number of pregnancies, and so the number of births, and 
so the number of deaths. These prevented deaths are deaths 
averted. The Study Group writes:
Of the 147 million child deaths prevented, 78 million (53%) would 
be deaths averted from scaling up family planning and 69 million 
(47%) would be lives saved from scaling up promotive, preventive 
and curative health services. Expanding access to contraception will 
be a particularly effective investment, accounting for half of the 
deaths averted, at small cost (4% of additional intervention- specific 
cost 2013–35).1
The DCPN project is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and its Disease Control Priorities volumes are 
published by the World Bank Group. Their Reproductive, 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health volume identifies 61 inter-
ventions that span reproductive health, maternal and newborn 
health, and child health. They model the costs and effects of 
expanding coverage of each intervention to 90% of the popu-
lation of 75 high- burden countries (the Study Group’s 74 plus 
one). Like the Study Group, DCPN singles out the impact of 
increased access to family planning:
The reproductive health package is particularly important for 
providing contraceptive services. Addressing 90% of unmet need 
in 2015 would reduce annual births by almost 28 million, which 
would consequently prevent 67 000 maternal deaths; 440 000 
neonatal deaths; 473 000 child deaths; and 564 000 stillbirths from 
avoided pregnancies.2
IMPLYING ANTINATALISM
An intervention that reduces the number of people born in a 
population will reduce the number of deaths in that population 
because those who are never born cannot die. The Study Group 
and DCPN’s calculation of the health benefits of family plan-
ning considers a subset of these potential people: those who, 
in the absence of the intervention, would have been born and 
then quickly died. They count preventing that particular subset 
of potential people from coming into existence as improving the 
health of the population. But the great majority of the poten-
tial people whose existences are prevented by contraceptive 
use would not die early deaths. Many would live long, largely 
healthy lives. What do the Study Group and DCPN have to 
say about this larger group of potential people? Are what they 
consider the deleterious effects of potential people meeting early 
deaths counteracted by the positive value of potential people 
living long, healthy lives?
Interestingly, the latter group is not mentioned: averting the 
lives of the potential people who, in the absence of the analysed 
interventions, would have been born and then lead flourishing 
lives is not counted as a downside of the interventions. At best 
then, the Study Group and DCPN place no value on creating 
someone who will lead a long, healthy life. However, they nega-
tively value lives that quickly end. This implies that the Study 
Group and DCPN treat being born as either neutral or bad.
Consider what this asymmetry in the way that the Study 
Group and DCPN treat creating lives means for their health 
economic analyses of interventions that affect the number of 
pregnancies. If an intervention brings a single life with negative 
value into existence, such as a child who dies as a neonate, then 
the calculation of that intervention’s impact on potential people 
will always come out negative. That would be the case even if 
the same intervention brought millions of flourishing lives into 
existence, because those lives are assigned at best neutral (zero) 
value. Since any time an individual is brought into existence 
there is some chance that they will die very early, the expected 
value of any intervention that affects the number of pregnan-
cies will be negative. The Study Group and DCPN’s position is 
therefore functionally antinatalist. In other words, they have at 
least tacitly bought into the position that bringing people into 
existence is, on balance, always bad.5
Antinatalism is a minority and controversial position.6 We 
therefore think it is unlikely that the Study Group and DCPN 
are actually committed to the view. It is more likely that they did 
not realise the functionally antinatalist implications of treating 
averted lives as either a health loss to a population or as neither 
loss nor gain. If the Study Group and DCPN are in fact committed 
to an antinatalist position, they should make that commitment 
explicit and defend it. On the other hand, if the Study Group 
and DCPN are not antinatalists, then they need to re- formulate 
their method for calculating the health benefits of interventions 
that affect the number of pregnancies in a population.
DEVALUING INTERVENTIONS THAT REDUCE INFERTILITY
A second reason to object to the Study Group and DCPN’s posi-
tion is that, consistently applied, it would imply that certain 
interventions have a negative impact because they treat or avert 
infertility. Recall that for the Study Group and DCPN, one 
mechanism by which stillbirths and child deaths are prevented 
is reduced pregnancies. Reproductive health interventions that 
reduce the number of pregnancies are thereby characterised 
as beneficial partially in terms of their impact on the number 
of stillbirths and child deaths. Following the same logic, inter-
ventions that increase the number of pregnancies should be 
regarded as harmful—or at least negatively valued—insofar as 
they thereby increase the number of stillbirths and child deaths. 
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That has potentially serious consequences for health economic 
analyses of interventions that address infertility.
Consider the Guttmacher Institute’s estimate that all women 
living in LMICs who are infected with chlamydia, gonorrhoea, 
trichomoniasis and syphilis—the four major sexually trans-
mitted infections (STIs)—could be cured for US$2.3 billion.7 
They regard this as a highly cost- effective use of healthcare 
funds. One of the major health benefits of treatment is reduc-
tion in infertility: the Guttmacher Institute claims that treating 
all women in LMICs infected with chlamydia and gonorrhoea 
alone would prevent 3 million cases of infertility caused by 
those STIs.7 Notably absent in their calculation of benefit is any 
consideration of the intervention’s impact on potential people—
despite the fact that reducing instances of unwanted infertility is 
likely to increase the number of pregnancies among the treated 
population. But if the Guttmacher Institute applied the Study 
Group and DCPN’s thinking here, then health economic anal-
yses of the intervention might come out negative. That is because 
investing money on averting preventable instances of infertility, 
thereby decreasing involuntary childlessness and increasing the 
number of pregnancies, would potentially lead to an increase in 
the number of stillbirths and child deaths.
Devaluing interventions that address infertility is highly prob-
lematic for a number of reasons. We mention just one here, 
which we believe is the most important. Reproductive justice, 
as conceptualised by its contemporary advocates, centres around 
the right to have children, the right not to have children and 
the right to raise children in a safe and healthy environment.8 9 
Crucially, the reproductive justice movement places equal value 
on the right to have children and the right not to have children, 
grounding both in the principle of reproductive autonomy. By 
devaluing health interventions that address involuntary child-
lessness caused by preventable infertility, the Study Group 
and DCPN undermine one side of the reproductive autonomy 
coin—the right to have children. That unfortunate fact should 
resonate with them, since both appear motivated by a desire 
to uphold and advance the right to reproductive healthcare. In 
fact, the Study Group’s analysis explicitly acknowledges ‘the 
intrinsic value of health and its role in meeting basic human 
rights’.1 DCPN, for its part, grounds all of its work in a human 
rights- based approach, arguing that one of the primary reasons 
for investing in increased access to reproductive healthcare is 
meeting basic ‘human rights and equity’ concerns.2
A POSSIBLE DIAGNOSIS
There is a mistake in reasoning made by the Study Group and 
DCPN that helps explain why they end up arguing that we can 
prevent the deaths of some fetuses, newborns and young chil-
dren by preventing them from ever existing. The mistake is easily 
replicable, so it is worth explicitly identifying and addressing it.
The proximate source of the mistake is that the Study Group 
and DCPN treat population itself—numbers of people qua 
numbers of people—as a health problem. As we have noted, 
for the Study Group and DCPN, one mechanism by which still-
births and child deaths are prevented is reduced pregnancies. If 
someone does not become pregnant, then they do not give birth, 
and so there is no risk that they give birth to a baby that dies. 
This logic can be extended beyond RMNCH. All else equal, a 
reduction in the number of pregnancies will also have the effect 
of reducing the number of young adults who die in road traffic 
accidents, develop mental disorders and so on, simply because 
the individuals who would experience these health events will 
not come into existence. Indeed, all else equal, any incremental 
reduction in the size of a population will almost always lead to 
a reduction in the population’s total burden of disease. This is 
a function of the fact that almost everyone experiences some ill 
health in their life. Removing a potential container of disease 
from a heap of containers will typically reduce the expected total 
amount of disease.
The implication of this reasoning is that if asked to choose 
between two possible futures that only differed in the size of 
their populations, we should prefer the future with the smaller 
population. Critically, we would be pushed to make that choice 
not because the future with the smaller population contained 
healthier people, but just because it contained fewer unhealthy 
people. Total burden of disease would be lower, but that would 
not entail a decrease in the average burden of disease.
Treating population itself as a health problem is problematic. 
We believe that the Study Group and DCPN correctly presup-
pose that health systems are and ought to be invested in reducing 
disease burden. However, we contend that within that credo lies 
an implicit condition: reductions in the disease burden should 
come from health interventions that target sources of morbidity 
and mortality affecting people who exist or will exist, rather 
than merely decreasing the number of people who will come into 
existence. Without that condition, the focus of health systems 
might shift, in part, away from health and toward population 
reduction—foci that are not obviously complementary.
That brings us to our diagnosis of the mistake: the Study 
Group and DCPN treat decisions that affect who and how many 
people are born in the same way as they treat decisions that do 
not affect who is born. But ethically these are quite different 
types of decisions. The latter, which encompasses most moral 
philosophy, considers the ethics of decisions that affect indi-
viduals who exist or will exist independent of those decisions. 
For example, neither choice available to the agent in the famous 
Trolley Problem directly affects who comes into existence.10 The 
choice at hand determines which existing individuals will survive 
or be killed.
The former set of decisions is the subject matter of an area of 
moral philosophy called ‘population ethics’. Population ethics 
analyses decisions that affect who is born and how many people 
are born. Policymakers deciding whether to increase access to 
assisted reproductive technologies are engaged in population 
ethics: their decision affects both who is born and also how 
many people are born. The practice of population ethics often 
involves making holistic evaluations about the relative goodness 
and badness of possible futures that differ primarily in popu-
lation size and quality of life. For example, it is a live question 
within the field whether and when increasing the size of a popu-
lation while decreasing the average lifetime well- being of its 
members is wrongful.
The evaluation of RMNCH interventions is complicated 
because many of them have predictable and substantial effects 
on both individuals who will exist independent of the inter-
vention and on which individuals come into existence. When 
the Study Group and DCPN combine lives saved and deaths 
averted through non- existence, they elide this distinction. But, 
as Greaves notes, this elision means that saving a 1- year- old from 
dying so that they go on to live another 60 years is evaluated 
the same as stopping the 1- year- old from ever coming into exis-
tence.4 Furthermore, as we noted above, insofar as the Study 
Group and DCPN engage in population ethics, they include 
only some of the effects on who will come to exist—they count 
young deaths averted but not the lives and deaths of those who 
would have lived much longer. There are multiple competing 
views within population ethics, but most would require us to 
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start with a full accounting of the quality and quantity of lives 
under different allocation scenarios.
It is important to be explicit about the limited nature of our 
diagnosis. We are not claiming that the Study Group and DCPN’s 
mistake was caused by their failure to adhere to a particular view 
within population ethics. Rather their mistake was caused by 
not recognising that they had entered into a realm that requires 
grappling with a particular kind of moral thinking.
CONCLUSION
The Study Group and DCPN claim that we can prevent still-
births and child deaths by preventing the decedents from ever 
existing. They then count those averted deaths as a health benefit 
of reproductive interventions that reduce the number of preg-
nancies. We have argued that this position is mistaken: there are 
philosophically and practically significant differences between 
averting stillbirths and child deaths through non- existence and 
other ways to prevent mortality. As currently described, the 
Study Group and DCPN’s methodology implies a view that 
is functionally antinatalist. Moreover, the Study Group and 
DCPN’s methodology devalues reproductive healthcare inter-
ventions that combat infertility and might shift the attention of 
health systems toward population reduction. We argued that the 
Study Group and DCPN make those mistakes because they treat 
population itself as a health problem and fail to recognise that 
population ethics involves different ethical considerations than 
the considerations used to evaluate decisions that only affect 
existing people.
We draw two sets of conclusions. The first has to do with 
what analysts should do now. To start, health economic anal-
yses of interventions that affect the number of viable pregnan-
cies should count stillbirths and child deaths averted through 
non- existence only if (a) there is a full accounting of the inter-
ventions’ effects on who comes into existence and how many 
people come into existence (ie, including people who do not die 
young); and (b) a justification for how the benefits stemming 
from potential people are counted relative to those coming from 
existing people. If that cannot be done, then health economic 
analyses should simply not count stillbirths and child deaths 
averted through non- existence as benefits of RMNCH inter-
ventions. They should, of course, continue to count the lives of 
existing people those interventions save.
The second set of conclusions has to do with directions for 
future research. Determining how potential people should be 
treated in health economic analyses will require grappling with 
population ethics. Critically, that would be the case even if the 
Study Group and DCPN took a different approach. Population 
ethics must be considered in any situation where decisions are 
being made about which people and how many people come into 
existence. At this point, we do not claim that there is a particular 
view that the Study Group and DCPN should adopt—that is a 
topic for further research.
We are now in the process of canvassing methods that avoid the 
inconsistencies described here, meaningfully consider population 
ethics and usefully measure the benefits of interventions that 
affect the number of viable pregnancies. One possibility would 
be to follow Greaves’ lead and search for an appropriate ‘value 
function that simply evaluates states of affairs’.4 Another possi-
bility would be to modify and then extend Leigh Senderowicz’s 
operationalised concept of ‘contraceptive autonomy’.11 And a 
third possibility would be to avoid using summary measurements 
of health or well- being altogether and instead adopt interme-
diate measurements like ‘couple years of protection’.3 Each of 
these options has pros and cons that still need to be explored.
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